Every month, some county commission or city council somewhere votes to commission a broadband feasibility study. It's a reasonable first step — and almost always the right instinct. Before investing tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in infrastructure, communities should understand what they're getting into.
The problem isn't the instinct. The problem is how most communities define "feasibility," what they do with the study once they have it, and what the study doesn't tell them that they actually need to know.
After helping communities navigate this process — including the $46 million Kendall County closing that took 30 months and nearly $1 million in legal fees to structure — we've developed a clear picture of where feasibility studies go wrong. Here are the most common mistakes.
The Five Mistakes
Treating "Feasible" as a Binary Answer
Communities ask their consultants whether broadband is "feasible" and expect a yes or no. But feasibility isn't a binary — it's a function of the financing structure, the technology mix, the take-rate assumptions, the partnership model, and a dozen other variables. The same network that's financially impossible under a traditional debt model might be entirely viable under a 63-20 P3 structure with a grant overlay. A study that says "not feasible" without exploring the full spectrum of structures isn't giving you a real answer.
Using a General-Purpose Consultant
Most broadband feasibility studies are conducted by engineering or planning consultants who know how to build networks but have limited experience with the financing structures that determine whether a community-owned network can actually be funded. The result is technically accurate cost estimates attached to financing assumptions that won't survive contact with a bond underwriter. A good feasibility study requires expertise in network engineering, financial modeling, grant landscape, bond market requirements, and municipal governance — typically from a team, not a single firm.
Underestimating Take-Rate Risk
The most consequential number in any broadband financial model is take rate — the percentage of potential subscribers who actually sign up for service. Most feasibility studies use optimistic take-rate assumptions (often 40–60%) without stress-testing what happens at 25% or 30%. In the Kendall County model, the grant-funded areas and bond-financed areas had different take-rate requirements because the capital structures were different. A rigorous feasibility study models multiple scenarios and identifies the minimum take rate required for financial sustainability under each structure.
Ignoring the Regulatory Education Required
Community broadband — especially P3 structures involving grants and bonds — requires working with regulatory bodies that may have never evaluated your specific model before. The Illinois Office of Broadband had never processed a true P3 broadband application when Kendall County applied. The regulatory education required was substantial and time-consuming. A feasibility study that doesn't account for regulatory engagement timeline, legal framework development, and the cost of educating agencies on novel structures will produce wildly optimistic timelines and budget estimates.
Commissioning a Study Without a Path to Action
The most common fate of a broadband feasibility study is to sit on a shelf. Communities commission studies, receive a document that says the project is theoretically viable, and then struggle to identify who should do what next. A feasibility study is only valuable if it's followed by a clear action plan, an identified partner with the capability to execute, and political will to commit to a multi-year development process. The study itself doesn't build the network — it just tells you whether building it makes sense. The gap between "makes sense" and "is built" is where most community broadband initiatives die.
"We've talked to communities that commissioned feasibility studies two or three times over a decade. Each study said broadband was viable. Nothing got built. The studies weren't the problem — the lack of a credible execution path was."— Jim Cannon, CEO, Pivot-Tech Development
What a Good Feasibility Process Actually Looks Like
After guiding projects from RFP through financial close, we've developed a framework for what rigorous feasibility work actually requires:
Components of a Rigorous Feasibility Process
- ✓Market demand analysis: Independent take-rate research from a firm like Roland Berger that models demand across income segments, incumbent competition, and geography — not just aggregate projections.
- ✓Multiple financing structure modeling: Full pro forma analysis for at least three structures — municipal debt, 63-20 P3, and grant-only/hybrid — with sensitivity analysis on take rates and construction costs.
- ✓Grant landscape review: Current-state analysis of available federal and state grants, eligibility requirements, match requirements, and realistic timelines — accounting for the fact that grant availability changes constantly.
- ✓Legal framework assessment: Review of state-specific constraints on municipal broadband, 63-20 nonprofit formation, bond issuance authority, and any state laws that could complicate the structure.
- ✓Regulatory timeline estimate: Realistic assessment of how long it will take to work through permitting, franchise agreements, pole attachment negotiations, and any novel regulatory education required.
- ✓Execution partner identification: A clear answer to "who is going to build and operate this?" — not as a future question, but as a prerequisite for the financial model.
The Pre-Development Investment That Unlocks Capital
One of the most important reframes for municipal leaders is understanding the difference between a feasibility study and a pre-development investment. A feasibility study costs $50,000–150,000 and tells you whether to proceed. A pre-development investment — which includes the legal framework development, detailed engineering, regulatory engagement, bond underwriter selection, and market study — costs $1–3.5 million and actually positions the project to close financing.
In Genesee County, Michigan, Pivot-Tech has proposed a $3.5 million pre-development investment that would unlock access to $175–200 million in 63-20 tax-exempt capital. The leverage ratio is approximately 50:1. The pre-development cost is substantial — but it's not an expense, it's an investment that enables a $200 million financing event.
Communities that understand this distinction stop asking "is broadband feasible?" and start asking "what pre-development investment do we need to make the financing possible?" That's a much more productive question — and it's what leads to networks getting built.
"The legal framework for Kendall County cost nearly $1 million to build and took two years. We absorbed most of that cost because we knew it would be replicable. Communities considering a P3 broadband project today benefit from that investment — the template exists, the regulatory path has been walked, and the timeline is dramatically shorter."— Jim Cannon, CEO, Pivot-Tech Development